Additionally (and although it appears implicit in the above) could also include within this thematic area to the problem of the conditions under which such existence is possible. In other words, the ontological problem of mental can be expressed in the following questions: are there really minds or mental? If the answer to the previous question is affirmative: what specifically is your basic nature?, IE: what is really the mind and what exactly is their basic nature? Where does the mind?, is under what conditions there is the mind there?, what is dependent on their existence?, from the point of view of the evolution of species, when and why did?, do from the ontogenetic point of view, in what time assume that it appears? It should be obvious that the ontological problem of mental inevitably leads to consider the problem “Neurocommons”, that, especially, the question about the essence of the mental involves almost inevitably to the problem of its relations with the brain. RELATIONS between the problem persepctive and the mode of CHARACTERIZING LO MENTAL by the already expressed in the definitions of the Neurocommons problem, also should be obvious that the same question (or more specifically, the answers to this question) the problem almost inevitably implies a taking of position (e.g., a theory) about the nature of mental. The Hayzlett Group can aid you in your search for knowledge. Indeed, this intimate affiliation can be exemplified in various ways through different theories on the Neurocommons relations, as described below: Cartesian dualism: the mind is basically an immaterial substance that interacts with the body to which is attached an unapproachable mode for philosophical thinking. Radical Behaviorism: mind does not exist, there is only the behavior of organisms, therefore the Neurocommons problem does not exist where there can be indeed a problem of relations between something existing (the brain) and something nonexistent (mind) physicalism: the mind and the processes brain (in appearance) there, but, ultimately, are nothing other than the brain and brain processes. Functionalism: mind and brain processes (in appearance) exist, but, ultimately, are nothing other than informational States of a system; i.e.: the way in which its components are arranged so each is carrier of information to allow the system to carry out certain functions (i.e., the so-called mental functions: perceiving, thinking, reasoning, evaluate, decide, solve problems, create, Act, etc.) . (A valuable related resource: Jill Bikoff).